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Abstract 
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Stockpile Technology (NNSA/NA-123) chartered a 
risk assessment of the Tritium Readiness (TR) Subprogram to identify risks and to develop handling strategies with 
specific action items that could be scheduled and tracked to completion in order to minimize program failures. This 
assessment was performed by a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) comprised of representatives from various 
organizations participating in the TR Subprogram. The process was coordinated by Savannah River Site, Systems 
Engineering (SRS/SE) with support from Subprogram Team.  
The Risk Management Process steps performed during this risk assessment were: Planning, Identification, 
Grading, Handling, and Impact Determination.  All of the information captured during the risk assessment was 
recorded in a database.  The team provided estimates for the cost and schedule impacts of implementing the 
recommended handling strategies and facilitated the risk based cost contingency analysis.  The application of the 
Risk Management Practices to the NNSA Tritium Readiness Subprogram resulted in: 
· The quarterly review and update of the Risk Management Database to include an evaluation of all 
existing risks and the identification/evaluation of any potential new risks. 
· The risk status and handling strategy action item tracking mechanism that has visibility and buy-in 
throughout the Tritium Readiness Subprogram to ensure that approved actions are completed as 
scheduled and that risk reduction is being achieved. 
· The generation of a risk-based cost contingency estimate that may be used by the Tritium Readiness 
Subprogram Manager in establishing future year program budgets. 
 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
One of NNSA’s missions is to provide tritium to the US nuclear stockpile.  The purpose of the Tritium Readiness 
Subprogram of the Readiness Program is to establish a system that can ensure that the inventory is maintained by 
producing new tritium to replace that tritium lost to radioactive decay and consumption.  The Tritium Production 
System being established by this subprogram will produce tritium by irradiating the NNSA-designed Tritium 
Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs) in reactors operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an 
independent government agency.  These TPBARs will be manufactured commercially.  After irradiation, the 
radioactive TPBARs will be removed from the reactors and transported to a new Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at 
the Savannah River Site (SRS).  There the tritium will be removed from the rods using a special vacuum-thermal 
process. 
An assessment of NNSA Tritium Readiness Subprogram risks were conducted as part of the risk management 
process adopted by the NNSA.  The goal of this overall assessment was to identify risks to the NNSA Tritium 
Subprogram and to develop handling strategies with specific action items that could be scheduled and tracked to 
completion in order to minimize program failures.  The issues and assumptions developed during the assessment 
planning stage were considered during several meetings by a team (hereafter referred to as Team) comprised of 
individuals representing Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), WesDyne, Kansas City Plant (KCP), NNSA, 
NAC, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and Savannah River Site (SRS) in identifying risks. 
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2.0 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The methodology employed for the risk assessment was based on current NNSA risk management methodology 
(see References 1 thru 3) and also included elements of the risk management process as it is currently being 
taught within NNSA in the “Systems Thinking” training program.  This process also follows the guidance provided in 
Appendix B, Risk Analysis & Management, of Reference 2.  
Process steps performed during this risk assessment were limited to the following elements: 
 
· Planning,  
· Identification,  
· Grading,  
· Handling, and  
· Impact Determination to include cost contingency for residual risks and handling strategies.   
 
All of the information captured during the risk assessment was recorded in a database. 
2.1 Planning 
Risk management planning provides an approach for screening an activity for potential risks and for preparing a 
plan to assess and manage these events throughout the life cycle of the activity.  The following items in planning 
were addressed during this risk assessment: 1). Selection of assessable elements, and 2). Calibration of likelihood 
and consequence definitions used to grade risks.  The Team developed criteria against which to judge the 
likelihood that a risk might or could be made to occur (respectively).  Criteria were also developed to judge the 
magnitude of risk consequences.  These criteria are provided in Appendix A.  
2.2 Identification 
Identification is an organized approach for determining which events may affect the program and for documenting 
the characteristics of the events that may happen with a basis as to why these events are considered risks.  Using 
brainstorming, the list of issues and assumptions created during the risk assessment kickoff meetings, and the 
information gathered during the vendor/supplier interviews, the Team identified and documented risks by creating 
statements of event that included: 
· The baseline – the normal situation for the element containing the risk (e.g. – assumptions, design 
basis). 
· The event – some other incident, occurrence, circumstance, etc., that may happen that is different from 
the normal situation. 
· The impact – a statement of what affect or result the event will or could have on the normal situation 
(including performance, cost, and schedule impacts). 
This information was entered into a database that was used throughout the rest of the process to capture the 
assessment details and provide a vehicle for reporting the results. 
2.3 Grading 
Grading is the process of evaluating the likelihood that the risk event will occur, assessing the range of possible 
outcomes (consequences), and combining these two elements to establish a risk level.  These grading results may 
then be used to prioritize risks.  Using the definitions for likelihood and consequence defined in Tables A-1 and A-2 
in Appendix A), the team evaluated all identified risks and determined a risk level of High, Moderate, or Low for 
each event.  Risk levels were determined by simply plotting the likelihood and consequence values for each risk on 
the matrix shown in Figure A-1 in Appendix A. 
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2.4 Handling 
For risks, handling involves the identification of specific responsive actions to the risk and an assessment of the 
effectiveness of that handling strategy.  Risk handling strategies are developed with the purpose of eliminating or at 
least reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of an identified risk.  Assessing the effectiveness of the handling 
strategy is accomplished by identifying and grading any residual risk that may remain after the implementation of 
the prescribed handling strategy. 
For risks, the Team assigned one of four handling strategies, Avoid, Transfer, Mitigate, or Accept (as shown in 
Figure A-2 in Appendix A) to each of the risk items.  In order to maximize risk reduction, the Team made a 
concerted effort not to assign a handling strategy of Accept to High or Moderate risks.  As noted above, the 
common objective is to select a handling strategy that will either maximize risk reduction or, where possible, 
eliminate the risk altogether. 
Handling strategies that do not completely eliminate risk (i.e. – Mitigate or Accept) result in residual risk that must 
be reevaluated in a manner similar to the evaluation of the original risk.  For each of these residual risks, the Team 
graded residual risk levels using the same process described above under Grading. 
2.5 Impact Determination 
Risk impact determination is an evaluation of cost and schedule impact of the risks on the program.  It includes not 
only the cost and schedule impacts of implementing risk handling strategies, but also the residual risk cost and 
schedule impacts.  To facilitate this process, the Team provided estimates for the cost and schedule impacts of 
implementing the recommended handling strategies.  In addition, the Team provided estimates for cost and 
schedule impacts of the residual risks (best, most likely, and worst case) to facilitate the generation of a risk-based 
cost contingency estimate that may be used by the Tritium Readiness Subprogram Manager in establishing future 
year program budgets. 
 
3.0 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
3.1 Initial Findings 
The Team identified a total of ninety-four (94) risks events.  As of January 2006, the Team dispositioned forty-one 
(41) events as ‘combined with others’, ‘deleted’, and ‘resolved’ resulting in fifty-three (53) “Active” risk events.  
These fifty-three (53) active risk events are documented on the Risk Assessment Forms.  The initial assessment of 
fifty (50) out of 53 active events designated twenty-one (21) High, twenty-two (22) Moderate and 7 Low level risks.   
An initial formal assessment was not completed by the Team on the three events because they were long-term 
programmatic type events.   
The Team evaluated these active risks and provided handling strategies.  The assessment provided impact of 
these active risks on the TRP in light of the various risk handling strategies (accept, avoid, mitigate) and the 
assigned “post-handling” residual risk level.  These handling strategies when implemented would result in residual 
risks with seven (7) High, sixteen (16) Moderate and twenty (20) Low level risks.  This assessment also provided a 
cost contingency analysis using “Crystal Ball
®
” software.    
3.2 Analysis of Handling Strategy Effectiveness 
The handling strategies recommended by the Team for the forty-eight active risks are tabulated as shown at right in 
Table 3.2-1.   
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Table 3.2-1 Handling Strategies 
Avoid 4 
Transfer 0 
Mitigate 31 
Accept 13 
 
The risk handling strategies resulted in reduction in the risk levels as shown in the Table 3.2-2. 
Table 3.2-2 - Impact of Risk Handling Strategies 
  
Initial Risk 
Level 
 Residual 
Risk Level 
High 21 7 
Moderate 22 16 
Low 7 20 
 
4.3 Analysis of Cost and Schedule Impact 
Risks may have cost and schedule impacts to the program in two ways:  
1) Impacts of implementing handling strategies, and/or  
2) Impacts of residual risks.   
In the case of handling strategies, the normal process is to simply sum the total of all risk handling strategy 
implementation cost estimates provided by the Team during the assessment and then factor those additional costs 
into program budgets as appropriate.  The rationale for this process is the assumption that handling strategies for 
risks have not previously been factored into existing program budgets, and for these strategies to be successful, 
they must be funded and scheduled in revised program plans. 
For risks, there are also the cost and schedule impacts associated with residual risk – a forecast of the risk that 
remains after the successful implementation of a handling strategy.  It is not appropriate to simply sum the residual 
risk costs since not all, nor perhaps will any, of the residual risks materialize.  To address the uncertainty in these 
potential residual risk cost impacts, a technique is employed that uses residual risk cost distributions based on the 
Team’s estimates of Best Case, Most Likely, and Worst Case cost impacts for each residual risk.  These 
distributions are then combined with the residual risk likelihoods for each of the residual risks in a Monte Carlo 
simulation to derive a cumulative distribution that defines a forecast of residual risk-based cost contingency for the 
program.   
The results of this risk contingency analysis show that the program should keep a reserve of approximately 
$32.52M for an 80% confidence that the program will be able to address the potential (probabilistic) cost impacts 
for currently identified residual risks that may materialize.  Also, based on the individual contribution of each risk to 
the total (mean) contingency number is used to determine the ranking of the risks.  This ranking and their percent 
contribution is listed in the following table: 
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Table 4.4 - Risk Ranking Based on Mean Contingency Contribution 
 
Ranking Risk 
ID 
Title Mean 
Contingency 
$K 
Mean-Total 
Contingency 
$K 
% 
 
 
1 40 Equipment Design Change  6,181.11 22,284 27.74 
2 38 Impacts of Costing Factors Outside Program's 
Control 3,329.46 
22,284 
14.94 
3 77 Yield Impacts Production Success 2,259.09 22,284 10.14 
4 8  Loss of Vendor A as a Long-Term Supplier 2,162.99 22,284 9.71 
5 33 Equipment Consolidation Process Design 1,746.17 22,284 7.84 
6 4 Loss of Vendor B as a Long-Term Supplier 1,523.00 22,284 6.83 
7 23  Loss of Testing Capability  800.46 22,284 3.59 
8 48 Unable to Reduce Uncertainties to Meet Program 
Needs 
520.48 22,284 2.34 
9 41 Equipment Performance impact 506.85 22,284 2.27 
10 92 Excessive impurities in Materials 493.01 22,284 2.21 
 
Total Cost Contingency 
Percentiles Contingency  
($K) 
60% 22,470 
80% 32,511 
 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Team identified a total of ninety-four (94) risks events.  As of January 2006, the Team dispositioned forty-one 
(41) events as ‘combined with others’, ‘deleted’, and ‘resolved’ resulting in fifty-three (53) “Active” risks events.  
These fifty-three (53) active risk events are documented on the Risk Assessment Forms similar to one shown in 
Appendix C.  The initial assessment of fifty (50) out of 53 active events designated twenty-one (21) High, twenty-
two (22) Moderate and 7 Low level risks.   An initial formal assessment was not completed by the Team on the 
three events because they were long-term programmatic type events. 
As requested by NNSA, the Team evaluated risks and provided recommended handling strategies.  These handling 
strategies were evaluated, prioritized, turned into actionable tasks for risk reduction.  The Team made the following 
recommendations: 
1. The risk point of contact (POC) should prioritize each risk, develop an action plan complete with 
implementation cost and schedule estimates, and make a recommendation to NNSA for a path forward. 
2. If required, task plans and budgets should be updated to reflect the new scopes of work. 
3. The Risk Management Database should be reviewed and updated quarterly to reflect decisions that have 
been made and work that has been completed. 
4. The program quarterly review should include an evaluation of all existing risks and the 
identification/evaluation of any potential new risks.  New risks should be added to the database and 
assigned to a responsible POC. 
5. A handling strategy action item tracking mechanism that has visibility and buy-in throughout the Tritium 
Readiness Subprogram must be established to ensure that approved actions are completed as scheduled 
and that risk reduction is being achieved.  
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6. Based upon the results of the risk contingency analysis, it is recommended that the program should keep a 
reserve of approximately $32.52M for an 80% confidence that the program will be able to bear the potential 
costs associated with the risks.  To fund this contingency in annual budget a contingency utilization plan 
should be developed. 
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Programs Office, Washington, DC 20585 (September 17, 2003). 
2. Systems Engineering Methodology Guidance Manual.  NNSA NA12-02-00034, Revision D1, U.S. DOE 
Defense Programs Office, Washington, DC 20585 (October 15, 2002). 
3. Systems Engineering Methodology Guidance Manual.  WSRC Manual WSRC-IM-98-00033, Revision 10 
Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC 29808 (February 26, 2004). 
 
7.0 APPENDIXES 
Appendix A Risk Grading Guidelines 
Appendix B Risk-Based Cost Contingency Analysis 
Appendix C Risk Assessment Forms 
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APPENDIX A – Risk Grading Guidelines 
Tables A-1 and A-2 shown below and on the following page were used by the Team to define the likelihood and 
consequence of each risk identified during the assessment process.  These definitions were used to evaluate both 
the initial and residual risk levels.  Risk levels (High, Moderate, or Low) were determined using the matrix shown in 
Figure A-1.  Handling strategies for each of the risks were selected from the four strategies shown in Figure A-2. 
Table A-1 Guidelines for Assigning Risk Likelihood 
Likelihood of 
Occurrence (L) Criteria
1 
Non-Credible2 Determined (through formal probability calculations) to have a probability of occurrence of ≤ 10-6 (or other non-credible probability defined for the activity) 
Very Unlikely 
· Will not likely occur anytime in the life cycle of the Tritium Readiness 
Subprogram; or 
· Estimated recurrence interval > 20 years (or perceived life of program); or  
· Estimated recurrence frequency < 1 (i.e., event not expected to recur); or  
· 0% < Likelihood of single event occurrence < 15%. 
Unlikely 
· Will not likely occur in the life cycle of the Tritium Readiness Subprogram; 
or 
· 10 years < Estimated recurrence interval ≤ 20 years; or 
· 1 ≤ Estimated recurrence frequency < 2 (i.e., event expected to recur but 
not more than once); or  
· 15% ≤ Likelihood of single event occurrence < 45%. 
Likely 
· May occur sometime during the life cycle of the Tritium Readiness 
Subprogram; or 
· 5 years < Estimated recurrence interval ≤ 10 years; or 
· 2 ≤ Estimated recurrence frequency < 5 (i.e., event expected to recur from 
2 to 4 times); or  
· 45% ≤ Likelihood of single event occurrence < 75%. 
Very Likely 
· Will likely occur sometime during the life cycle of the Tritium Readiness 
Subprogram; or 
· Estimated recurrence interval ≤ 5 years; or  
· Estimated recurrence frequency ≥ 5 (i.e., event expected to recur more 
than five times); or  
· 75% ≤ Likelihood of single event occurrence < 100%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1  All likelihood ranges are strictly qualitative – no numeric precision is implied. 
2  This category is normally reserved for the evaluation of residual risks associated with Crisis consequences. 
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Table A-2 Guidelines for Assigning Risk Consequences3 
Consequence of 
Occurrence (C)4 Criteria
5 
Negligible 
· Minimal consequences; unimportant. 
· Some potential transfer of money (≤ $500K), but budget estimates not 
exceeded. 
· Negligible impact on program; minimal potential for schedule change; 
compensated by available schedule float. 
Marginal 
· Small reduction in Tritium Readiness Subprogram technical performance. 
· Moderate threat to Tritium Readiness Subprogram mission, environment, or 
people; may require minor facility redesign or repair, minor environmental 
remediation, or first aid/minor medical intervention. 
· Cost estimates marginally exceed planned budget (> $500K, but ≤ $1M). 
· Minor slip in schedule (anything less than 3 months) with some potential 
adjustment to milestones required. 
· No impact to scheduled reactor irradiation cycles. 
Significant 
· Significant degradation in Tritium Readiness Subprogram technical 
performance. 
· Significant threat to Tritium Readiness Subprogram mission, environment, or 
people; requires some facility redesign or repair, significant environmental 
remediation, or causes injury requiring medical treatment. 
· Cost estimates significantly exceed planned budget (> $1M, but ≤ $5M). 
· Significant slip in schedule (3 months to less than 12 months) with resulting 
milestones changes that may affect Tritium Readiness Subprogram mission. 
· Unable to provide planned quantity of TPBARs for an irradiation cycle, but 
able to support program at lower than planned level. 
Critical 
· Technical goals of Tritium Readiness Subprogram cannot be achieved. 
· Serious threat to Tritium Readiness Subprogram mission, environment, or 
people; possibly completing only portions of the mission or requiring major 
facility redesign or rebuilding, extensive environmental remediation, or 
intensive medical care for life-threatening injury. 
· Cost estimates seriously exceed planned budget (> $5M, but ≤ $10M). 
· Excessive schedule slip (12 months to ≤ 18 months) unacceptably affecting 
overall mission of Tritium Readiness Subprogram objectives, etc. 
· Unable to supply TPBARs at planned level for more than one irradiation cycle. 
Crisis 
· Tritium Readiness Subprogram cannot be completed. 
· Cost estimates unacceptably exceed planned budget (> $10M). 
· Catastrophic threat to program mission; possibly causing loss of mission. 
· Schedule slips > 18 months. 
· Unable to support an entire irradiation cycle. 
                                                        
3  These criteria may be modified at the discretion of the current Team. 
4  Special attention must be given to first-of-a-kind risks because they are often associated with activity failure.  First-of-a-kind 
risks should receive a Critical or Crisis consequence estimate unless there is a compelling argument for a lesser consequence 
value determination. 
5  Any one or more of the criteria in the five levels of consequence may apply to a single risk.  The overall consequence level 
for the risk being evaluated must be based upon the highest level for which a criterion applies. 
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Figure A-1.  Risk Grading Matrix 
MitigateTransferAvoid Accept
Risk Handling
Strategies
 
Figure A-2.  Risk Handling Strategies 
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APPENDIX B – Residual Risk-Based Cost Contingency Analysis 
This appendix provides a basis for the estimate of a residual risk-based cost contingency to the program using a 
methodology that is normally used to develop risk-based contingency estimates for capital projects.  The Team 
provided a Best Case, Most Likely, and Worst Case cost estimate for each of the residual risks during the 
assessment process.  These values were used to create triangular cost distribution assumptions for each of the 
residual risks.  These assumptions were then used together with uniform distributions representing the respective 
likelihoods of occurrence for each residual risk in a Monte Carlo simulation to generate a cumulative curve forecast 
of risk-based cost contingency.  The results of that simulation are shown below in Figure B-1. 
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Figure B-1.  Cumulative Residual Risk-Based Cost Contingency 
Note: All risk-based cost numbers are in $K 
Risk Ranking Based on Mean Contingency Contribution 
Risk ID Mean Mean-Total % Ranking 
40 6,181.11 22,284 27.74 1 
38 3,329.46 22,284 14.94 2 
77 2,259.09 22,284 10.14 3 
8 2,162.99 22,284 9.71 4 
33 1,746.17 22,284 7.84 5 
4 1,523.00 22,284 6.83 6 
23 800.46 22,284 3.59 7 
48 520.48 22,284 2.34 8 
41 506.85 22,284 2.27 9 
92 493.01 22,284 2.21 10 
 
Cost Contingency 
Percentiles Total Risk 
60% 22,470 
80% 32,511 
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The significance of this data is that it shows the program must keep a reserve of approximately $32.52M for an 
80% confidence that the program will be able to address the cost impacts for currently identified residual risks that 
may materialize.   
 
APPENDIX C – Risk Assessment Forms 
This Appendix provides a copy of sample Risk Assessment Form used during the risk assessment process.  These 
sheets are sorted by the event number (referred to elsewhere in this report as Event ID).  In addition to providing 
information summarized elsewhere in this report, these forms provide statements and bases for the likelihood and 
consequence values selected by the Team.  All of the information presented on these forms is contained in the 
NNSA TR Subprogram Risk Assessment Database. 
 
Risk Assessment Form 
ID Number:  Revision: Last Date Evaluated:  Status:  
Event Title:  
Type: Risk   Category:      
Assess. Element:  Title:  
Responsible Org:  Contact:  Date Identified:  
Statement of Event:  
Likelihood:  Basis: 
Consequence / 
Benefit:  
Basis: 
Most Significant Cost Impact ($k):  Most Significant Schedule Impact (Mos):  
Level:  Event Trigger:  
Handling Strategy:  Description: 
Handling Strategy Action Items: 
 
HS Implementation 
Cost  ($K):  
Basis:  
HS Implementation 
Schedule (Mos):  
Basis: 
Other Handling Strategies:  
Statement of Residual Risk: 
Residual 
Likelihood:  
Basis:  
Residual 
Consequence:  
Basis: 
Residual Risk 
Level: Moderate  
Residual Cost 
Impact ($K): 
Best Case 
 
Most Likely 
 
Worst Case 
 
Residual Schedule 
Impact (Mos):    
Residual Impact Basis: 
Impacted Scope of Work:  
Evaluation Comments:  
Event Comments:  
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